Fatshimetrie – Amid tensions in Israel, a wave of discontent is sweeping the country’s streets, with tens of thousands of protesters taking part in what have been dubbed a “week of disruption.” Anti-government demonstrators have blocked major highways, staged walkouts, and called for a general strike.
The protesters’ demands are many and varied: a hostage deal, new elections, mandatory military service for ultra-Orthodox Jews, more attention for northerners, and more. Across Israel, banners on buildings and roads call for “Elections Now!” and declare alongside pictures of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: “You are the leader; it’s your fault.”
Yet one fundamental question continues to resonate across Israel eight months after October 7: How could the region’s most advanced military, with its renowned intelligence service, have failed so blatantly to anticipate the Hamas terror attack?
Calls for a state commission of inquiry into the security and intelligence failures that led to October 7 are growing louder, coming from the Israeli public, opposition lawmakers, relatives of IDF field observers killed or captured, and the attorney general. They are demanding an investigation into the deadliest event in the country’s history.
But analysts say that is unlikely under Netanyahu’s government. And if it does happen, it would not guarantee the answers the country seeks, even if new reports reveal what Israel knew in advance.
On Monday, Israel’s public broadcaster Kan 11 added to the growing body of evidence that the country’s leadership could have—or at least should have—known that an attack was possible.
Kan 11 detailed a document from Unit 8200, the Israeli military’s main intelligence division, regarding Hamas’s plans to attack military installations and communities and take between 200 and 250 hostages. The document was dated September 19, 2023, less than three weeks before the October 7 attack. It was particularly striking in that it accurately predicted that Hamas would take 250 hostages.
These new allegations add to November reports from The New York Times and Haaretz that military intelligence was aware of Hamas’s plans to overwhelm Israel’s fortifications around Gaza, allowing militants to push into southern Israel.
In December, State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman announced an investigation into intelligence failures prior to the October 7 Hamas attack.. Months later, struggling to gain cooperation from the Prime Minister’s Office and the IDF, Englman wrote in a letter to the Prime Minister’s Office and the IDF Chief of Staff that his mission was “to conduct a comprehensive audit of the largest failure in the country’s history.”
This week, Israel’s High Court suspended the investigation after considering classified arguments from security agencies, prompting an exasperated Englman to ask whether his teams should “put up a sign ‘on pause, back in two years’?” ”
Meanwhile, the Israel Defense Forces launched a series of internal investigations this year into the failures leading up to October 7, followed by more limited examinations of individual battles on the day of the attacks. These investigations will allow Israel to learn from its failures, even in times of war. The first results are expected in the coming weeks.
What Israel lacks is its most powerful investigative tool – a state commission of inquiry – blocked by Netanyahu and his allies, who are trying to delay it until after the war. A state commission of inquiry is an independent body with broad powers, including the ability to compel witnesses to testify.
But the main way to create such a commission is by government decision, and this government has made it clear that it is not on the current agenda.
Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, professor of public policy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, believes that “the likelihood of an investigation is very, very low.”
“In over 17 years of Netanyahu governments, we have not had any number of investigations,” Sulitzeanu-Kenan points out. Historically, Israel has conducted a public inquiry about every two years, he said, but that has not been the case under its current and longest-serving leader. The purchase of German submarines and surface ships prompted an investigation in 2022, but only during Netanyahu’s 18-month tenure out of power.
“While it is very clear that an investigation should be carried out, the political probability is almost zero under the current government,” says Sulitzeanu-Kenan. “As soon as you appoint a public inquiry, you at least send an implicit message that something bad happened.”
In conclusion, Israel finds itself at a turning point where transparency and accountability are essential to ease tensions and close the painful chapter of October 7. People are waiting for answers, and the decisions made in the coming months will shape not only the future of the country, but also their confidence in its institutions and leaders.